

PNAN 63-6

No. 58
June 1980

Center for Policy Studies

Working Papers

AFGHANISTAN: POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE "LAND OF INSOLENCE"

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Abstract

Most assessments of the current crisis in Afghanistan have focused on the turbulent political events of the country's recent past and the factor of Soviet geostrategic aims and ambitions in the Middle East and South Asia. The present crisis, however, has clear historical origins in the tensions built into the Afghan state from its inception: the divisive geographic and ethno-demographic features; the demographic regime in the country of exceptionally high fertility and mortality and rapid population growth; and the limited gains resulting from a strategy of "guided" development and reform that was adopted in the 1950s. This paper describes some of the problems confronting the Afghan state which emerged in the late nineteenth century, surveys demographic patterns in Afghanistan with the aid of findings of a 1972/73 national demographic survey, and reviews efforts to foster development and to arrive at an equilibrium of social and political forces. The final section comments on some of the factors likely to have a bearing on the resolution of the crisis and on the longer term development of the country.

POPULATION COUNCIL LIBRARY CATALOGUING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Lieberman, Samuel S.

Afghanistan: population and development in the land of
violence / Samuel S. Lieberman. — New York: The
Population Council, June 1980.

p. — (Population Council. Center for Policy Studies.
Working paper, 58)

1. Population — Economic aspects — Afghanistan. 2. Afghan-
istan — Population. 3. Afghanistan — Economic policy.
I. Title. II. Series.

HB882.P66 no.58 [HB3636]

6.80.hnz

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This paper is scheduled to appear in the Population and Development Review,
Vol. 6, No. 2.

Afghanistan, a poor, largely agricultural country with a heterogeneous population of approximately 15 million people, is currently experiencing the most severe—but not the first—protracted, violent, and all-encompassing crisis in its 100-year history as a national entity. The present crisis finds Soviet soldiers, who control the cities and major transportation routes, and the remnants of the armed forces and supporters of the short-lived regime of Nur Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and the People's Democratic Party, pitted against diverse and mutually distrustful insurgent groups. Continuing civil war, with direct and massive Soviet involvement, has resulted in extensive loss of life in centers of urban and rural resistance and the arrest and execution of large numbers of officers, administrators, teachers, and others in leadership positions.¹ The rural economy, already disrupted by the ill-considered agricultural reforms of the Taraki government, has been further disturbed by the interruptions of transit traffic caused by rebel ambushes and damaged roads and by the mass flight of Afghans to Pakistan and Iran. By early April 1980, some 681,928 refugees had been registered by the Pakistani government, with thousands more waiting to be registered, while Iranian officials reported an influx of 200,000-300,000 refugees.² In the cities, there are reports of strikes, shortages, breakdowns of public services, closure of educational institutions, and the like.

What led to these convulsive events? What conditions and currents are responsible for the character and severity of the crisis in Afghanistan? Apart from the factor of Soviet geostrategic aims and ambitions, the explanations offered in recent months have focused on the assassinations, government errors, and "accidental" factors that brought down Daud's republican regime

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in April 1978, the objectives and tactics of rival leftist parties in Afghanistan, and the miscalculations of Soviet advisers and leftist leaders once the revolutionary regime was installed.³ Largely absent from such treatments is an account of the historic origins of the present crisis—the tensions built into the Afghan state from its inception; the divisive geographic and ethno-demographic features; the demographic regime in the country of exceptionally high fertility and mortality and rapid population growth; and the limited gains resulting from a strategy of "guided" development and reform that was adopted in the 1950s. I discuss the emergence of an independent Afghan state in the section that follows. In subsequent sections, I survey demographic patterns, review efforts to foster development and to arrive at an equilibrium of social and political forces, and comment upon some of the factors likely to have a bearing on the resolution of the crisis and on the longer term development of the country.

I. The Precarious Foundations of the Afghan State

The area now called Afghanistan—the ranges of the Hindu Kush, interior valleys, plateaus and adjoining terraces, and desert areas—acquired strategic importance in the mid-nineteenth century as the British extended and consolidated their power in the Indian subcontinent and the Czarist Russian Empire expanded eastward. At that time, Afghanistan was made up of warring tribal principalities, petty mountain states, and ethnic enclaves spilling over the present national borders. In the "great game," the British and Russians vied for influence and back; rival individuals and groups in political and military struggles in Afghanistan.⁴ At first, the British aimed for direct, military control of the Hindu Kush and its eastern and southern flanks. This

"forward policy" was subsequently abandoned in the face of stubborn resistance and a series of military blunders. Instead, the British turned to a policy of "masterly inactivity" and nonintervention--a policy aimed at creating an Afghan buffer state within internationally guaranteed frontiers.

This goal was realized in the career of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901).⁵ The British supported Abdur Rahman's claim to the emirate of Kabul--the territory that became, along with Afghan Turkestan, Herat and Kandahar, one of the four major provinces of Afghanistan--and paid him a yearly subsidy. Abdur Rahman was encouraged to unify the country and promised a free hand in his internal policies. In an eventful reign, the "Iron Amir" used guile, financial and moral inducements, military force, and brutal repression to overcome Pushtun tribal opposition. Abdur Rahman conquered the sovereign Tajiks and Uzbeks, the heterodox Hazaras and the pagan Kafirs, pacified other groups, and began the process of creating a multinational state in what he called "yaghestan," "the land of insolence."⁶

The rule of Abdur Rahman and his son Habibullah (1901-19) brought a period of relative peace and stability to Afghanistan. Centralized government authority was bolstered and a policy of reform and reorganization was initiated with objectives similar to the programs of selective, "defensive" modernization undertaken in Turkey and Iran.⁷ The positive contributions of Abdur Rahman included formation of a standing army; social, legal, and religious reforms; and creation of a small civil administration to collect taxes and process military conscripts. Abdur Rahman propagated a view of Afghanistan as an independent nontribal state with a unified political culture. He confessed to a "great desire for making railways, introducing telegraphs and steamers, working the mines, opening banks, and issuing bank

notes, inviting travellers and capitalists from all parts of the world, and opening universities and other modern institutions in Afghanistan.⁸ In his dealings with the British and other foreign powers, Abdur Rahman was determined and successful in resisting initiatives that could compromise Afghan neutrality and undermine the social fabric and the still tentative political institutions of the country.

Along with these accomplishments, Abdur Rahman left a legacy of unsolved problems and difficult dilemmas for would-be modernizers in Afghanistan. First, internal security and the unity and stability of the Afghan nation-state remained in jeopardy in Abdur Rahman's time and have continued in a perilous condition. The effectiveness of the national government was impeded by geographic factors—rugged terrain and severe climate—and by the demographic makeup of the country. Afghanistan is divided into communities of unequal size and power with divergent linguistic, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal affiliations and loyalties;⁹ the many distinct elements in the society encounter one another in patterns of interdependence and conflict that have become increasingly complex as a result of the growth and redistribution of the population. A similarly fragmented picture characterized Turkey and Iran in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But development-minded governments in those countries, faced with separatist movements, factional strife, and the task of mobilizing support for social and political changes, could turn to the symbols, instruments, and institutions of Ottoman and Qajar imperial rule. Such means of unifying and integrating the population have not been available in Afghanistan, a country of peripheral involvement in the Muslim world and of limited exposure to Western influence.

~~Second, Afghanistan remained subject to pressures and threats from~~
outside powers--the British and Russians in Abdur Rahman's time, the British and the Soviets in the inter-war period, and the Soviets and Americans since World War II.¹⁰ The strategic Panjdeh oasis in Afghan Turkestan was occupied by Russian forces in 1885, and Russian parties moved freely into the Wakhan Valley and even into Kashmir and Chitral in present-day Pakistan. Russian actions continued to arouse suspicion even after the signing of the 1907 convention in which the Czarist government declared Afghanistan to be outside her sphere of influence. The British saw Afghanistan as a dependency and subordinate ally and insisted, until the 1919 border war in which Afghanistan won complete sovereignty, that the country's foreign relations be conducted by the colonial government in India. In 1893, Abdur Rahman was forced to accept the "Durand Line" as the de facto frontier with British India. The Durand Agreement, which afforded the British strategic control of border passes, established an international boundary for Afghanistan that is artificial, politically divisive, and administratively unmanageable. As with Afghanistan's border with Russian-held territories, the Durand line divides densely populated and relatively homogeneous areas and leaves the regime in Kabul vulnerable to externally inspired tribal uprisings.

Third, the largely pastoral and agricultural economy of Afghanistan remained impoverished and unreconstructed. Agriculture is possible in but a limited number of oases, irrigated valleys, and rain-fed zones in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there is a rich potential to be exploited in such areas.¹¹ The Koh-i-Daman region near Kabul, for example, was renowned in the nineteenth century for its viticulture and deciduous fruits. The Hari river basin in Herat province became known for irrigated cotton production,

cereals, and tobacco, and the Jalalabad oasis for its citrus fruits, sugarcane, and rice cultivation. Agricultural production in such favored areas, however, was restricted by limitations of market and technology--the low level of fertilizer use and the dependence on labor-intensive and inefficient irrigation methods--and disrupted by foreign invasions and tribal conflicts. If only because of the slow development of transportation facilities, Afghanistan never became a major supplier of primary products to foreign markets. As a result, the reorganization of agricultural production in response to market pressures was more restricted in scope in Afghanistan than in Turkey and Iran and in the Indian subcontinent. Afghanistan's economic prospects were harmed by government fiscal and foreign policies. Taxes, which were levied on cultivators, on the numerically small urban population, and on the movement of goods, had an inhibiting effect on commerce but provided insufficient revenue to finance development projects. At the same time, Abdur Rahman's isolationist stance, which was maintained by his successors until the 1950s, denied the country many of the economic benefits of closer ties to the imperial powers--investment in infrastructure and educational institutions, transfer of technology, formation of a professional civil service.

In essence then, the Afghanistan created by Abdur Rahman was an experimental and artificial entity, maintained in a precarious balance in the face of internal challenges and external threats. Abdur Rahman's successors have sought to strengthen this delicate structure so as to accommodate ethnodemographic, regional, and class-based pressures and to introduce developmental changes.

II. The Demography of Afghanistan

In the traditional statecraft of Afghanistan, population concerns were considered an aspect of the overriding problem of preserving internal security and maintaining control over the diverse and antagonistic groups in the country. Relying on crude calculations and statistical indicators, government authorities from the time of Abdur Rahman showed an awareness of and a sensitivity to the size, distribution, and prosperity of different groups and communities. An official census was reportedly ordered by Abdur Rahman in 1892 as a means of identifying different national elements, increasing tax revenues from various sections of the country, and preparing a registry of men available for military service.¹² The scope and outcome of this exercise are not known, but Lord Curzon came away from his visit to Kabul in 1895 quoting an estimate of 5 million people, a figure that was generally accepted at the time.¹³ Abdur Rahman's concern for the security of his regime and for the effects of population pressure in the agricultural zones near Herat and Kabul contributed to his decision to support a settlement program in the relatively empty northern and northwestern regions.

The conviction that vast expanses of arable land were available to accommodate population increases has remained pervasive in Afghanistan. The second five-year plan (1963-67), for example, accepts as a "basic fact" that no significant population pressure exists in the country.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the "population problem" in Afghanistan began to be redefined in the 1960s and 1970s as the first bodies of demographic data, still of limited extent and dubious quality, were collected and the costs of establishing new agricultural settlements became more apparent. In the following paragraphs, I examine some dimensions of Afghanistan's political demography before turning to recent

efforts to provide a quantitative statement of the size, distribution, and dynamic characteristics of the population.

The dominant group in Afghanistan's polyethnic system is the Pashto-speaking, Sunni Muslim Pashtuns. Pashtun influence is due to numerical strength and mobility and to a social and political organization that imparts strong primordial sentiments to members. Pashtun tribal organization has been characterized by Barth as a system of segmented, self-replicating units without centralized institutions.¹⁵ The basic unit is the khel, the clan community and military group. Khels are grouped into tribes, kaum or qabili, which are themselves linked into confederations. Conflict within and between Pashtun tribes and tribal groupings, between Pashtun and non-Pashtun communities, and between Pashtun and other ethnic groups and government forces has long been a feature of life in Afghanistan. A major military and political rivalry among Pashtun tribal confederations has been that between the Durrani who are settled in the vicinity of Kandahar and the largely nomadic nonadic Ghilzais who are based in the area between Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Ghazni. Other Pashtun tribes and tribal groupings, the source of considerable turmoil and conflict in their own right, occupy areas south and east of Kabul. From their traditional base, the Pashtuns have now gained a demographic foothold in areas beyond the Hindu Kush. This resettlement in non-Pashtun areas was originally fostered by Abdur Rahman, himself of the Barakzai branch of the Durrani confederation, as a means of diluting Ghilzai tribal resistance and of establishing a loyal Pashtun presence among the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Pashtun migration to northern provinces and to strategic southwestern locations has continued in recent years with the opening-up of irrigated tracts for cultivation in what were once wastelands.

Pashtun khels generally occupy a common locality in which lands are owned by member clans and families. Tribal social organization has egalitarian and hierarchical features. Traditions of hospitality, strong kinship ties and mutual aid, martial valor, equity, and revenge are codified in the Pushtunwali, the unwritten system of tribal law that guarantees the right to be heard in a jirgah, a clan or tribal assembly, and sanctifies the principle of community authority. Tribal cohesion and equity were once promoted through periodic redistributions of land holdings. Control of land now rests with economically and politically prominent individuals, tribal khans, who serve as patrons and landlords to kinsmen and to hansaya, the non-Pashtun client groups living within or in proximity to Pashtun settlements. The tribal notables are less wealthy and less powerful than their counterparts in Pakistan and in pre-land reform Iran.¹⁶ Afghan tribal khans typically owe their preeminence to personal qualities of leadership and to a willingness to compete for followers through the exercise of patronage.

Other groups of numerical and political significance in Afghanistan include the Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkomans.¹⁷ The Persian-speaking Hazaras live in tribally organized agricultural and pastoral settlements in the mountainous central provinces, called the Hazarajat. The Hazaras are largely Shiite and have been subjected to invasion, heavy taxation and enslavement by orthodox Sunni Uzbeks and, more recently, Pashtuns. Many Hazaras have become debtors and bonded sharecroppers to nomadic Pashtun traders. An acute land shortage in the Hazarajat has produced a migration to Kabul and other urban centers and a movement to Pashtun areas where Hazaras, together with Baluch, Brahui, and other client groups serve as sharecroppers.¹⁸ Northern and northeastern areas of Afghanistan are occupied mainly by Persian-

speaking Tajiks and Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and Turkomans, although the demographic composition of this onetime frontier area changed as a result of the immigration and settlement of Pashtun nomads, which continued into the 1950s. Tajiks are heavily represented in urban commercial and artisanal occupations while maintaining a strong agricultural tradition in the provinces of Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan. Sizable numbers of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkomans fleeing Soviet rule entered Afghanistan from the north of the Amu Darya in the 1920s and 1930s. The tribally organized Uzbeks and Turkomans are based in Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, and Samangan in Afghan Turkestan where they are farmers and semi-nomadic breeders of karakul sheep.

The size of each of these distinctive constituents of the Afghan polity has long been reckoned on the basis of administrative indicators and rules of thumb. A commonly encountered calculation puts the Pashtun proportion at over one-half, the Tajik at under one-third, and the combined Uzbek and Turkoman proportion at one-eighth of the population. Hazara, Nuri, Baluch, Brahui, and other communities make up the remainder. However, estimates of total population size at any given time and the numbers in the different constituent groups have varied widely.¹⁹ Fortunately, recent work, in particular the National Demographic and Family Guidance Survey (known as the A56 survey from the Afghan Demographic Studies program), the first national demographic survey of Afghanistan, undertaken in settled areas between fall 1972 and fall 1973 and among the nomadic population in the summer of 1974, and the Greater Kabul Survey of mortality and fertility patterns, conducted between 1972 and 1973, permits a closer mapping of the Afghan population in quantitative terms than has heretofore been possible.²⁰

The ADS, funded largely by the United States Agency for International Development and organized by the State University of New York at Buffalo and the Afghan Central Statistical Office, conducted approximately 21,000 household interviews, covering some 140,000 individuals, among the settled population. The numbers of cases and indeed the entire set of procedures adopted in surveying the nomadic population remain undisclosed. The ADS was a costly and difficult undertaking in which a number of innovative techniques and procedures were introduced. Notable among these were a method of sampling and estimation in which inference from sample to nonsample units depended on population size measures not available when the sample was drawn, and the use of female interviewers to collect pregnancy histories in remote rural settings.²¹ Questions have been raised with respect to the validity of this sampling scheme and the assumptions adopted in generalizing sample results to total population estimates.²² In addition, the reliability of the survey results has been a source of some concern, particularly with respect to age misreporting and underenumeration of females. Despite the necessity for the application of sizable correction factors, there is fair agreement, on the basis of ADS results, that the total settled population in 1972-73 was 11.5 million.²³ There is less confidence in the ADS-based estimate of the nomadic population--1.3 million in 1974--as independent government estimates put that population at roughly 2.4 million in the mid-1970s.²⁴ Accepting the corrected ADS figures and an ADS-based estimate of the current growth rate of 2.2 percent yields a mid-1979 estimate of 13.3 million for the settled population of Afghanistan and a total population estimate of 14.8 million. Accepting the larger figure for the nomadic population yields a mid-1979 total of 15.8 million.²⁵

ADS results provide some insights into the size of the urban population and the distribution of population within Afghanistan's rural sector. The sedentary population is thought to account for at least 90 percent of the population, with urban and settled rural groups constituting 15 and 85 percent, respectively, of this total. Within the urban segment, Kabul (uncorrected population estimate of 597,000 in 1973 and perhaps 750,000 in 1978), Kandahar (uncorrected 1973 estimate of 160,000), and Herat (uncorrected 1973 estimate of 111,000) are major cities, and Baghian, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, Ghazni, Gardez, and Kunduz are important regional centers. The rapid growth of Kabul can be marked out in approximate terms through reference to Soviet estimates of 215,000 in 1954 and 378,000 in 1962, a 1965 Greater Kabul Census estimate of 435,000, and a 1969 UN advisory team estimate of 520,000.²⁶ The growth of cities and towns in Afghanistan since World War II has reversed a decline in urban population and prosperity that began in the nineteenth century. Traditionally, Afghanistan's cities were transit and trading centers with groups of artisans and small-scale manufacturing. Cities now have important administrative and military command functions and provide a refuge for impoverished rural groups.

Afghanistan's rural population includes the million and a half or more nomads, most of whom are Pashtuns, who move from winter grazing sites in the valleys and plains to the west, northwest, and southwest of the Hindu Kush to summer pastures in the Hazarajat and in Badakhshan to the northeast. For the non-nomadic, largely agricultural segment of the rural population, density of settlement is greatest in eastern Afghanistan in the intensively cultivated plains and valleys formed by the Kabul River and its tributaries. A second region of significant rural settlement is in the lower valleys of the Kunduz

~~and Khanabad Rivers (provinces of Takhar and Kunduz) which drain into the Amu~~
Darya. Density of settlement remains at low levels in the newly irrigated areas in the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, in the basin of the Hari Rud in Herat Province, and in the deserts and mountainous wastelands of western and central Afghanistan. Within the rural sector, there appear to be significant differences in the per capita availability of agricultural resources. The Kunjuz and Helmand Valleys, zones of land reclamation and expanded irrigation, are favored, while the provinces of the Kabul Basin and the central provinces of Bamiyan and Wardak are at a disadvantage in regard to the per capita availability of irrigated land. The latter region, with a large Hazara population, is said to be experiencing resource depletion, a deteriorating local economy, and continuing out-migration.²⁷

Results of the ADS and the Greater Kabul Survey (GKS) indicate that vital rates are high in Afghanistan and likely to remain so. Estimates place the birth rate at between 50 and 53 per thousand population per year and the total fertility rate at approximately 8 per woman.²⁸ These estimates are consistent with fertility patterns in other heavily rural and economically backward Islamic settings. ADS results indicated that nearly 50 percent of women in the age-group 15-19 were currently married and virtually all women married by the end of the childbearing years; only 4 percent of women in the childbearing years could read; and less than 10 percent of the women interviewed in the survey were labor force participants. Both the ADS and the Greater Kabul Survey (GKS) show a similarity in the pattern and levels of fertility in urban and rural (data are for settled populations only) populations.²⁹ Marital fertility rates are apparently slightly higher for urban women under age 40, but this difference is offset by the smaller proportions of urban women in all age groups who are currently married.

Mortality is high in Afghanistan for infants, children, and adults alike. The crude death rate is estimated at between 28 and 32 per thousand with life expectancies at birth of 34 years for men and 36 years for women.³⁰ Mortality risks differ appreciably between rural and urban areas. A higher level of adult mortality in rural areas is suggested by the higher proportion of rural women widowed. Infant and child mortality rates are also higher in rural areas: roughly one-third of all rural children die before reaching the age of 5 as compared to one-quarter in cities and towns. Nevertheless, estimated infant mortality rates of more than 150 per thousand for Kabul testify to the inadequacy of the public health effort, even in the capital city. Preliminary analyses of the causes of death in Afghanistan emphasize the effects of malnutrition (as a direct and contributing factor) and infectious diseases such as diphtheria, tetanus, and pneumonia on the health of children; adult mortality has been attributed to many of the respiratory and gastrointestinal diseases that affect children. In addition, tuberculosis and malaria, important as a debilitating disease, continue to have a high incidence among adults in Afghanistan.³¹

ADG and GRS results support a prediction of continued high and perhaps increasing population growth rates; the present rate is estimated to be in the range of 1.8 percent to 2.7 percent with 2.2 percent frequently cited as a compromise "best" estimate.³² For one thing, Afghanistan's age structure has a youthful cast with an estimated 17.6 percent aged 5 or less, and 44.7 percent aged 14 or less. Second, an estimated birth rate of 54 even for cosmopolitan Kabul with its high proportion of Afghanistan's health and educational facilities suggests that an early downturn in fertility is un-

likely. Knowledge and practice of family planning remain at low levels, with the family planning information services provided by the privately sponsored Afghan Family Guidance Association, founded in 1968, having a negligible impact. ADS desired family size results reveal that high fertility is consistent with the intentions of individual families.³³ Finally, the potential exists for a rapid decline in mortality, especially the mortality of infants and children, if moderate improvements can be effected in preventive health care, in female educational levels, and in per capita income. Infant mortality rates are much lower in neighboring Pakistan although per capita income levels are comparable to those in Afghanistan.³⁴ Infant and child mortality rates are lower in Kabul, where health and nutritional levels are superior to those in rural Afghanistan. Within Kabul, there is evidence of infant and child mortality varying with environmental conditions.

III. Development Policies and Politics in Afghanistan

Afghanistan's development has been tied to the preservation or reconstitution of the alignment of internal forces and external pressures. A first attempt, in the reign of Amanullah (1919-29) a younger son of Habibullah, to depart from the fragile balance established by Abdur Rahman and to pursue a wide-ranging modernization program underestimated the obstacles to reform and elicited a fierce and destructive response. A second major development effort, embodied in the policies introduced by Prince Daud in 1953, was more finely calculated and had a more lasting impact. Nevertheless, this program faltered in the 1960s and ended in the cataclysmic events of 1978 and 1979. These episodes of reform, developmental change and political reaction are discussed in the present section.

The Reforms of Amanullah

The policies of Amanullah differed markedly from those of Abdur Rahman, whose modest development initiatives were aimed at improving military preparedness and internal security. Amanullah tried to confront the problems of the country.³⁵ His varied reforms, many of which were imaginatively conceived, were intended to transform the structure and character of Afghan society. Unfortunately, the program as a whole was poorly prepared, inadequately communicated to the population, and badly timed. Amanullah's economic measures, which included construction of showcase public buildings and factories stocked with costly imported machinery, were financially ruinous to a government whose British subsidy was terminated after a 1919 border war. Amanullah made little effort to mobilize support for his program, and his social reforms were offensive to the religious establishment. Amanullah demonstrated a quixotic disregard for the effectiveness and loyalty of the army and for the tenor of government relations with tribal elements and foreign powers. Military reforms amounted to reductions in pay and other economies and the introduction of military recruitment procedures that challenged the authority of tribal leaders. Amanullah's opposition to the British and his indifference to the revitalization of Russian, now Soviet, forces left his regime a target to externally funded campaigns of sedition.

Reaction to the program of Amanullah was swift and severe. Following the near success of a 1924 uprising, the government collapsed in 1929 in the face of rebellions mounted by Pashtun and Tajik groups. A bloody civil war broke out in the course of which Kabul was sacked and banners of regional and tribal independence were raised. Order was restored by 1932 by a former army commander, Nadir Khan, who took the title of Shah. Nadir Shah was assassinated

in 1933; his brothers ruled as regents for Nadir's son Zahir Shah (1933-73) until Daud, a nephew of Nadir, began his modernization efforts in the 1950s.

The administrations of Nadir Shah, Hashim Khan (1933-46), and Shah Mahmud (1946-53) saw a return to the policies of Abdur Rahman, a program that restored stability but left unattended Afghanistan's economic and political weaknesses. Development initiatives were motivated by strategic concerns. A road was opened linking Kabul to areas beyond the Hindu Kush, and government-supported joint stock companies linked to the private Bank-i-Milli reclaimed marshlands, constructed irrigation works, and introduced cotton cultivation and textile production in a number of northern provinces. The army was enlarged and given better training and equipment. Amanullah's educational reforms were continued, but his social and legal reforms were withdrawn as a concession to the mullahs. Military recruitment was returned to tribal leaders who were invited to serve in administrative positions and were promised veto powers on fiscal questions, foreign commitments, and modernization proposals.

The Daud Era

A major departure from the balancing policies of Abdur Rahman was launched by Prince Daud in 1953. Daud's innovation was to accept economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union and the United States; the intention was to use such aid to bolster the authority and security of the regime and to bring long-term development and stability to Afghanistan. Soviet aid began in 1953 with the extension of credits and technical assistance on a modest scale. A quantum increase in the flow of resources occurred following the 1955 "Pashtunistan" crisis.³⁶ This dispute, which was precipitated by Paki-

stan's denial of administrative autonomy to her own Pashtun areas, resulted in a blockade on transit traffic to and from Afghanistan and a full mobilization of the Afghan army. Daud convened a rare Loya Jirgah, a general assembly of tribal leaders, to solicit support for his Pashtunistan policy and to seek a mandate to obtain foreign assistance. The Soviets responded with 100 million dollars in long-term, low-interest credits for development activities and 25 million dollars in arms. The United States, which accepted the Durand line as an international frontier and which had earlier refused Afghan requests for military aid, now weighed in with substantial grants and credits for various projects.

Thus began an era, roughly 1956-67, of superpower competition and de facto cooperation in Afghanistan in which the United States and the Soviet Union provided 35 percent and 51 percent, respectively, of foreign loans and grants of over one billion dollars to Afghanistan.³⁷ Total aid flows peaked in real terms in 1965. Beginning in 1966, American aid underwent a sharp decline in real and relative terms. While gross aid flows were declining, an increase in Afghanistan's debt-service payments in the late 1960s further reduced the net flow of aid. To a limited extent, American assistance was replaced by support from China and West Germany and technical and financial aid from various international organizations. But Afghanistan was left closely dependent on loan agreements and trade connections with the USSR. The 1970s saw the emergence of Iran as an important donor, a modest recovery of US aid flows, and a limited revival of superpower economic competition in Afghanistan.

Foreign assistance was used first to enhance the preparedness and effec-

tiveness of the security forces of the regime.³⁸ The Afghan army, which had been called in to suppress a number of tribal uprisings in the 1930s and 1940s, performed poorly in the 1955 mobilization. An infusion of Soviet equipment and American and Soviet-supported construction of a network of all-weather roads brought vast improvements in the technological level, mobility, and logistical capability of Afghan forces, as well as economic benefits in lower transportation and information costs and increases in transferable skills. Large numbers of Afghan officers were sent for training in the Soviet Union. The army and air force were reorganized with Soviet assistance, although the traditional assignment of Pashtuns to the officer corps and Tajiks to lower ranking technical and administrative positions was maintained. Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras provided the bulk of the conscripts in the new armed forces whose size reached 90,000 men in 1965, twice the 1933 level. A greatly strengthened military capability allowed the ruling family to assert its authority and to establish its presence throughout the country. Some noted that military reorganization and the extension of roads and communications facilities, while changing the character of the tribal threat, left the regime vulnerable to a coup d'etat or to direct Soviet intervention.³⁹ What took precedence, however, in the thinking of Daud, his brother Mohammed Naim, and the "inner cabinet" of advisers was the opportunity provided to mobilize support for the regime through social and economic improvements.

Daud's program of development investments and social reforms was funded to a great extent through foreign assistance flows. Donor spending was directed to certain sectors.⁴⁰ For instance, the United States took on Afghanistan's educational system, improvements in transportation and commun-

ications, and the development of irrigation and power supplies; Soviet aid went to the construction of roads and to directly productive activities yielding goods that were used to repay loans. There was also a division of labor by region. US-funded activities were concentrated in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces in the southwest and in Kabul, while the Soviets were heavily involved in the eastern provinces and in the areas to the north of the Hindu Kush. Development priorities, intended patterns of investment, and the overall framework of growth were set out in three plans (1957-61, 1963-67, 1968-72), a fourth plan (1972-77) that was withdrawn, and an aborted seven-year plan (1976-82). The Afghan government assumed a guiding role in the development process, not only in the planning and budgeting of expenditures, but in the implementation of projects, the management of productive units and services, and through its sponsorship of social reforms. This strategy of state involvement and leadership in economic matters, particularly through the creation of state-financed, state-owned, and state-run enterprises was reminiscent, in many respects, of the statist approach that shaped development policy in Turkey and Iran in the 1930s.⁴¹

As in Turkey and Iran, government economic and social interventions were motivated by dissatisfaction with the slow pace of change and by a lack of confidence in the initiative and organizational capacity of the private sector. The Afghan government had given limited backing to private investors and entrepreneurs in the 1930s, especially to the newly founded Bank-i-Milli and to a number of import-export companies. And these policies had been effective then: rapid and integrated growth of agriculture and light industry, largely textiles, in Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan, was the result of

government infrastructural investments and of the initiatives of investors and newly arrived settlers. Nevertheless, planning documents in the 1950s and early 1960s, and again in the 1970s, claimed an expanded role for the state while expressing the view that "private enterprise does not possess adequate resources and experience for undertaking large-scale investment of the type required for achieving a rapid rate of growth."⁴²

The Afghan government grew in size and complexity as Daud's program took shape. New ministries, development agencies, authorized monopolies, and autonomous bodies appeared, all with large and diverse staffs; new services were provided and the responsibilities of provincial and local government units increased. Public sector investments and production activities were located in tasadys, semi-autonomous units comparable to the state economic enterprises established in Turkey in the 1930s. Along with its directly productive activities, the Afghan government became involved in import-export trade, in the retail sales of certain products, and in various educational, cultural, and social activities through such specialized institutions as the government press, the Pashto Academy, and the Women's Institute. Daud's government was more successful than Ataturk's statist regime in winning over the religious establishment.⁴³ Some village mullahs entered government service as primary school teachers. Financial support was provided for the operation of mosques and shrines, and resources were invested in specialized religious schools and in the Faculty of Theology of Kabul University with the aim of improving, and reorienting, religious training. Religious authorities played a role in the functioning of the judicial system, and a number of the ulama served in the Afghan parliament that was established in 1964. This

cooperation between the mullahs and the state undermined opposition to Shadi's social reforms--recognition of the right of women to remove the veil, which came in 1959, and the expansion of educational opportunities for women.

The priorities set in Afghanistan's guided development strategy were similar to those in statist Turkey. State financial and administrative resources were invested in transportation and infrastructural improvements, mineral and power production, increased output of light industrial goods, and rapid development of educational facilities. Accomplishments were impressive at the sectoral level in Afghanistan, as they were in Turkey.⁴⁴ There was significant growth in the first two five-year plans in production of cement, refined sugar, spun cotton, and flour--the four "whites" critical to Ataturk's industrial plans--as well as coal and electricity; new mineral, petroleum, and natural gas resources were discovered; 2,780 kilometers of paved highways and a network of airports were constructed; the number of schools, teachers, and students rose more than threefold in the period. In aggregate terms, development expenditures more than doubled over the two planning periods and the pace of growth and reform was as rapid as that in Turkey in the 1930s.

The Impact of Guided Development

While similar in purpose and in crude material accomplishments, the policies of guided, statist development in Afghanistan and Turkey gave rise to differing patterns of economic, social, and political change. In Turkey, the policies and reforms of Ataturk were consolidated and sustained. The authoritarian Kemalist regime was transformed into a multiparty democracy, while the mixed economy that emerged in the 1930s survived a number of crises and continued to evolve and to grow. In Afghanistan, the second decade of guided

development brought a marked slowdown in economic growth and a political crisis that proved insoluble.⁴⁵ Daud's policies, and specifically the implementation of the third and fourth five-year plans, were disturbed by the fall-off in foreign assistance flows, by severe droughts in 1970 and 1971, and by strains and pressures attributable to the program of investments and reforms itself. Some observations on the design, presentation, and implementation of statist strategies in Afghanistan and Turkey may help to account for the divergent consequences experienced in the two countries.

The Agricultural Strategy in Afghanistan Differences in the impact of guided development measures may be traced first to dissimilar "initial" conditions in Afghanistan and Turkey. The economic basis for a successful intensification of development existed in Turkey in the industrial capacity and railroad network inherited from the Ottoman empire, the pattern of export-crop specialization with established market linkages, and the availability of agricultural lands that could be cultivated without incurring heavy investment costs.⁴⁶ Afghanistan's resource position was less favorable, but the flow of foreign capital and expertise in the 1950s and 1960s made it possible to overcome savings and foreign exchange constraints and to construct roads, airports, new industrial plant, and so forth.

Foreign aid outlays were less successful, however, in bringing about sustained increases in agricultural production in Afghanistan and in providing opportunities for employment growth and regional development such as occurred in Turkey. Agricultural investments, which represented a relatively small but still significant proportion of the development budget, were directed toward major irrigation and land development projects, while agricultural research needs and support services went virtually unattended.⁴⁷ The largest under-

takings were the US-financed Helmand-Arghandab Valley (HAVA) project in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces and the Soviet-financed Ningrahar development project in Ningrahar Province.⁴⁸ The Helmand site was attractive because of the physical potential for irrigated farming, the strategic location, and the opportunities presented by the low indigenous population density in the area for the settlement of nomads and farmers from other regions. The HAVA project was initiated before World War II, continued by the American company Morris-Knudsen under contract to the Afghan government, and finally taken on and sustained over a 25-year period by the US assistance program. HAVA involved investments in diversion and storage dams, flood control works, reservoirs, delivery canals, a drainage system, roads and bridges, a power plant, land levelling, an administrative mechanism to coordinate settlement, education, research and extension activities and the like, and other expenditures to deal with unanticipated patterns of farmer behavior and unexpected problems of land deterioration, water-logging, and salinity.

The flow of benefits from this massive effort was delayed, however, and only began reaching significant proportions in the mid-1970s.⁴⁹ Similarly, the smaller Ningrahar development scheme encountered unforeseen technical and economic problems and resulted in lengthy and costly operational delays.⁵⁰ In aggregate terms, per capita food production in Afghanistan appears to have declined or at best held constant during the period of guided development (approximately 1956-78).⁵¹ Meanwhile, continued poor agricultural performance, which was a factor in the difficulties experienced in other sectors, became a divisive issue within the government and between the government and foreign donors. USAID officials, for example, and other advisers argued from the mid-1960s onward for a more decentralized agricultural effort focused on

provision of yield-increasing services and inputs and small-scale improvements in established agricultural areas. Some gains were registered along these lines, but government preferences for large-scale irrigation projects remained much in evidence in recent planning exercises.

The Administrative Constraint The interventionist approach to development undertaken in Turkey also benefited from the presence of an elite administrative cadre, trained in the Ottoman tradition of financial and economic reform, social engineering, and political compromise. In Afghanistan, the development effort in the 1960s and 1970s was aided by the planning and managerial services of thousands of foreign advisers. However, the net result of the reliance on foreign assistance flows may have actually been to increase and to complicate the managerial task by requiring government officials to spend an inordinate amount of time coordinating and supervising donor activities.⁵² In any event, the burden of implementing projects and government commitments and administering the cumbersome machinery of state fell on a small, inexperienced, and poorly trained group of officials and civil servants.

This administrative constraint, discussed by foreign commentators and treated at length by Abdul Majid Zaboli,⁵³ president of the Bank-i-Milli group, in a 1970 analysis of obstacles to growth in Afghanistan, was manifest in the delays in completing and following-up projects, and in the lackluster performance both of operating public enterprises and of the government program as a whole. Some delays and costs were due to inescapable difficulties in the construction and start-up stages of large-scale, technologically sophisticated irrigation networks, power plants, and commodity production endeavors. But

planning and administrative shortcomings—poor information flows; an absence of cost-benefit analysis; inadequate management, coordination, and supervision of projects; excessive centralization of decision making; and rampant corruption among underpaid employees—must have lengthened gestation periods and contributed to the low capacity utilization and high costs of public enterprises and the limited growth dividends enjoyed by the general population.⁵⁴

Deficient management practices were also responsible, at least in part, for the inability of the government to mobilize domestic savings and initiative for development purposes.⁵⁵ The state's own modest contribution to national development expenditures depended on deficit financing, indirect taxes, and revenues from publicly provided goods and services. Government revenues invariably fell short of targets because the collection of taxes was unsystematic and unstandardized, and the tax on imports and exports, licenses, and so forth were often arbitrary and unrelated to the rate of inflation or to goals such as output maximization or greater equity. Government loans to settlers in the Helmand and other projects frequently went unpaid, while much of the output and services provided by public enterprises was sold at prices that failed to recover costs. While the government's own revenue collection efforts faltered, there was a significant failure of the rudimentary private banking sector to attract funds and to make credits available to agricultural and industrial enterprises.

The Conceptualization and Presentation of Statist Policies In his discussion of the state of the economy, Abdul Majid Zabolli expressed concern that the country was "on the brink of anarchy" and condemned the lack of "honest direction" by government planners.⁵⁶ His comments point to significant

differences between statist Turkey and Afghanistan in the formulation of development policies and in the strategies adopted to gain public acceptance and backing for such measures. In Turkey, government investments and social reforms were fashioned according to a well-articulated ideology--summarized in the principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism--of national strength and solidarity. The government program was introduced in a carefully phased sequence and accompanied by a well-prepared effort through such institutions as the "People's Houses" to involve the average person in the modernization process and to obtain the support and participation of groups with different interests and perspectives. The Republican People's Party, created by Ataturk in 1923, proved effective as a vehicle of coalition politics, linking together military and bureaucratic groups, the commercial classes, and leading elements of the provincial "periphery" in a durable alliance on behalf of a well-defined program. Ataturk's party took on executive and educational tasks and functioned in effect as an arm of the government itself.

In Afghanistan, much as in Iran under Reza Shah, the aims and activities of the government had an ad hoc quality. Daud failed to set out a coherent program or an amalgamating "growth philosophy." The five-year plans were unimpressive documents drawn up with the assistance of foreign advisers and consisting of extensive "shopping lists" of projects with little commentary on the need for or priority assigned to particular expenditures. Individual reforms and policies were introduced in a disconnected fashion. For example, the potentially significant right accorded to women to remove the veil and to end seclusion was presented as a voluntary matter, compatible with and sanctioned by Islamic law, rather than as a necessary and desirable step toward a

new social order. Daud himself produced no blueprint, memorable pamphlets or addresses, or a single Speech, such as that of Ataturk, that detailed the problems of the country and provided a view of society and national goals as a justification for the policies of guided development. Daud was unable or unwilling to use some of the rich themes of Afghan history—ethnic diversity, resistance to foreign domination, Islamic piety, and tribal traditions of equity and justice—as a means of elucidating his development program.

Daud missed an opportunity to create a political party or instrumentality that could enlist support for his program and serve as a channel of communications between the government and areas or groups not immediately benefited by development investments. Such an organizational medium could have been employed in Afghanistan to bind together the diverse ethnic and regional groups and the newly emerged educated classes into an activist coalition. Instead, Daud tried in the 1950s and 1960s and again in the mid-1970s to use the Pashtunistan dispute—an issue of limited interest to non-Pashtun groups --to rally support for the regime and its program. In general terms, Daud avoided a direct challenge to the authority and power of the tribal and religious establishment, preferring to establish powerful counterweights to traditional institutions in the army and in the state economic sector.

Daud's failure to convey modernization aims and to characterize the process, sequence, and incidence of reform and change was costly in economic, social and political terms. His policies alienated the commercial sector, which played such a significant role in Turkey's development, by creating an atmosphere of uncertainty over the general role of private enterprise and by bringing commercial investments and activities under scrutiny and regulation. In regard to other groups, there was resentment over the disproportionate flow

of benefits to urban centers, especially Kabul, where the major part of the industrial sector and the institutions of higher education were established, and to Pashtun-speaking districts, which received agricultural, educational, and health services before other rural areas.⁵⁷

IV. The Current Crisis

Mohammed Ali, a member of the entourage of Nadir Shah, left a vivid description of conditions in Afghanistan in 1930 following the overthrow of Amanullah and the emergence of the Tajik leader, Bacha-i-Saqao:

During the short space of nine months the terrible Saqaoists had spread devastation and ruin all over the country; from the confines of Herat in the west right up to the Indian border in the east, pestilence and famines, robbery and dacoity were the order of the day. There was no order, no law, save that might was right. When the present king took Kabul, he found the whole country in a chaos, tribal wars raging on all sides, trade and agriculture badly crippled, people half starving and diseased, and many dressed in rags with their skin showing through the rents and imploring for food, villages deserted, houses burnt, thousands of people rendered homeless, schools and colleges entirely closed, some of them burnt and demolished, the students having taken shelter in far off and remote places. . . . The granaries were empty, and the grainfields had been neglected for reaping the gruesome harvest of human lives.⁵⁸

Accounts disturbingly similar to this one are beginning to emerge from present day Afghanistan. Yet, nowhere does one see a Nadir Shah or Abdur Rahman type figure moving cautiously and methodically to build an alliance among the different groups and elements in the population, to reassert the authority of the central administration, and to restore a modicum of stability to the country.

What future then for Afghanistan? Is the area condemned to years of turmoil, economic disruption, and forced migration of a significant proportion

of the population, or can a durable regime emerge to forge a new, more lasting unity in the country and to carry forward the development efforts begun in the Daud era? In the remaining pages of this analysis, I consider some of the principal factors, both favorable and unfavorable, affecting the possible solution of the crisis and future development in Afghanistan.

One major difference between the present crisis and that of 1929-31 lies in the political means, formulas, and guidelines available for the resolution of political disputes. The 1929 conflagration, which began as a minor clash between Shinwari Pashtun tribesmen and government troops and spread spontaneously among Pashtun and non-Pashtun groups, was a tribal response to attempts of the Kabul regime to extend its authority in rural areas. A settlement was reached only after Nadir Shah agreed to withdraw the military, administrative, and social reforms introduced by Amanullah and to return to the conception of tribal rights and authority adhered to by Abdur Rahman.

In 1980, in a much more variegated political and social landscape, the contest is less for tribal and regional autonomy than for representation in the military and economic machine inherited from the Daud era and for participation in the control over the modernization process. What further distinguishes the current crisis is the absence of mechanisms for bringing about compromise: the indigenous and imported models and political formulations that could serve as a basis for an accommodation appear to have been exhausted. The present upheaval is not a sudden outpouring of accumulated resentment. Rather Afghanistan is in the most acute stage of a crisis that began in the early 1960s in reaction to Daud's policies and has since passed through distinct phases—a parliamentary interlude (1965-73); an autocratic republican regime (1973-78); a radical marxist government formed in 1978—of political

innovation and disintegration. Of these experimental efforts, the failure of the parliamentary government, which was based on a constitution promulgated in 1964, is indicative of the political difficulties that have been encountered in Afghanistan and that persist today. The functioning of the parliament was impeded by the extreme separation of legislative and executive powers mandated in the constitution and by the king's decision against the formation of political parties, which did not, in any case, slow the development of extremist left-wing and Islamic parties among Kabul's large student population. Parliament took on the role of critic and investigator, but not partner, to government initiatives, and became a forum in which past and present divisions surfaced and crystallized, grievances festered, but no stable ruling alliance emerged, no governing coalition took shape, no compelling centrist program was formulated, and little legislation was passed.⁵⁹

A second major difference between the present crisis and the situation that prevailed in 1929 lies in the commitment of Soviet soldiers and weaponry to the defense of the regime in Kabul. In 1929, the Soviets protested the overthrow of Amanullah and even financed an abortive bid by Afghanistan's ambassador to Moscow to seize power. The Soviets, however, were not in a strong position, militarily and economically, to intervene directly in the 1929-31 crisis. Instead, they acquiesced to the selection of Nadir Shah through the processes of tribal politics and welcomed Nadir's adoption of the neutralist, balancing principles of Abdur Rahman.

The December 1979 Soviet move to rescue the government of the People's Democratic Party was predicated on the assessment, which arguably was fundamentally correct, that indigenous political processes had lost the capacity to produce a stable nonthreatening regime. This intervention, which continues

today, is the final manifestation of a Soviet "forward policy" that began to emerge in the early 1970s, especially 1973, when increased support was offered following the establishment of a republic with Daud as president and prime minister. The factors that contributed to the abandonment of the strategy of the 1950s and 1960s--the Soviet Union's own version of "masterly inactivity" in which they reorganized the Afghan army and contributed to all aspects of the development program while pursuing what American scholars generally considered to be limited objectives⁶⁰--need not detain us here. The Soviets no doubt concluded as did one British observer that "the issues of the policy of masterly inactivity were too difficult and too delicate, there were so many factors which might destroy their equilibrium, and there were no means of restoring the balance once this was upset."⁶¹

But what are the risks and what are the opportunities, in regard to the emergence of a stable regime in Afghanistan and the resumption of development activities, associated with the present Soviet forward policy? This question needs to be examined from short-run and long-term perspectives. The matter of immediate interest is whether a Soviet-backed regime can establish a framework of order and security sufficient to stem the heavy migration across the eastern frontier, to entice a large part of the refugees now in Pakistan to return, and to permit a return to normalcy in economic and social affairs. No firm conclusion is possible on this point. There is no doubt that the Soviets blundered badly in the support and guidance they gave to the government of Taraki and Amin, which pursued reckless and brutal policies and encountered resistance from the moment it took power in April 1978. The ranks of the People's Democratic Party have been decimated through internal purges and as a result of losses to insurgent groups; it will be some time (if ever) before

the new party leadership can implement the more conciliatory approach it has promised.⁶² At the same time, the Soviet military, even with its superiority in air power and its effective control of major roads, may find it difficult to contain the resistance struggle, especially as the rebel forces have grown through desertions from the Afghan army and been strengthened by the flow of arms and men across the Pakistani border.

On the (difficult) assumption that the immediate crisis can be managed and that at least an interim political solution can be worked out, the longer term issue of development and prosperity in Afghanistan can be examined. Compared to the situation that existed in 1930 and even in 1953 when Daud introduced the policy of guided development, Afghanistan now possesses some industrial and hydroelectric capacity, proven mineral reserves, and some capacity to exploit coal and natural gas supplies. It also has a well-developed primary road network, an irrigation system that provides controlled water supplies to large tracts of land, and an educational sector in which enrollment at all levels has grown rapidly.

At the same time, Afghanistan remains an extremely poor country, one whose modernization has been thwarted despite a significant inflow of foreign assistance and whose policies and faulty management had, by the late 1960s, generated skepticism, in donor circles, as to the indigenous commitment to change and the potential for further development.⁶³ The backwardness of the country is attested to in low literacy rates; high rates of infant, child, and adult mortality; the inferior status of women; and inadequate supplies of food and fuel. Afghanistan is subject to food shortfalls, such as the devastating drought of 1970-72. In recent decades, growth in the production of cereals has barely kept up with or has fallen below the rate of population

growth. High costs and technological difficulties were experienced in opening up new agricultural zones; there are indications of resource depletion and fragmentation of holdings in densely populated agricultural areas. This suggests that a major effort will be required if food production is to keep pace with population growth rates, which are already high but may well reach higher levels. If mortality and fertility remain at present levels, and if the million or more refugees return home, the population can be expected to grow to 25 million or more in the next 20 years. If life expectancy improves to the current Pakistani level of approximately 50 years and fertility remains unchanged, the Afghan population will approach 30 million in the year 2000.

What approaches can be adopted, what policies applied to deal with this unsettling development picture? Based on the advice tendered in the last 25 years, it would be reasonable to expect the Soviets and their Afghan clients to continue the strategy of developing the state economic sector with an emphasis on large-scale infrastructure and industrial undertakings, including production of intermediate and capital goods. Such a focus was in evidence in the "General Policy Framework" of the seven-year plan prepared with Soviet assistance and published in 1976. In this document, the highest priority of the regime was declared to be "the creation of heavy industries such as mineral extraction, machinery manufacturing units, chemical and power industries, etc., which are basically necessary for rapid economic growth and for the maintenance of an independent economy."⁶⁴ These goals were reiterated in statements issued by the Taraki government, whose draft five-year plan was also compiled with Soviet assistance.

This strategy has obvious disadvantages and would very likely impose

heavy costs on the Afghan population (and the Soviet consumer). The approach has worked poorly under Afghan management, and under Soviet guidance its implementation and administration would require extensive reliance on centralized direction and "commandism." Much of the strategy would have to be filled out and further specified, including agricultural policies, the role of the private sector, delivery of social services and benefits, and the pattern of integration to be established between the economies of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. While some of the costs could be offset through exports to the USSR of natural gas, iron ore, copper, and cotton and citrus fruits from large state farms, the flow of resources—capital equipment, raw materials and food supplies, administrative and technical personnel—would have to be heavily in Afghanistan's favor. Nevertheless, the model of the centrally planned industrializing economy may well prove attractive because of its political advantages and its familiarity and congeniality to the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Soviets are no doubt aware of an alternative model of agriculture-based development in Afghanistan. This strategy, which was favored by USAID officials,⁶⁶ envisages what is essentially a market-directed process of increased investment, rising yields, and rising production in an agricultural sector of relatively small-scale units. This approach promises greater returns in the short run, and considering Afghanistan's location and resource endowment, in the long term as well, but it would be especially difficult for a Soviet-controlled regime to pursue. The strategy involves a shift of emphasis within agriculture away from massive irrigation projects in sparsely populated areas. An effort would be made to increase productivity and cropping intensities in such established agricultural areas as the Kabul Basin,

through production incentives, provision of fertilizer, improved seeds, credits, and extension and marketing services, initiation of locally organized land improvement projects, and the development of a research capacity.

The ramifications of an agricultural-based strategy in a country such as Afghanistan are properly the subject of a separate essay. Suffice it to say here that such an approach, while relying heavily on farmer responses to market signals, also requires extensive public interventions and organizational inputs to amplify or to offset market impulses and could entail administrative costs rivaling those of the centrally planned industry-oriented model. Soviet planners have little or no experience in managing such a modified market approach, which they might in any case reject on ideological grounds, and thus could not be expected to sponsor such a strategy in Afghanistan.

Notes

Research assistance provided by Christine Britton is gratefully acknowledged.

1. For information on the maltreatment, execution, and "disappearance" of political prisoners under the Taraki regime, see Amnesty International, "Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," London, September 1979.
2. Records of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees show the numbers of officially registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan increasing from 80,000 (4/79) to 185,000 (8/79), 400,000 (1/80), 487,789 (2/80), and 681,928 (4/6/80). The Iranian figures are rough estimates provided by government spokesmen.
3. See L. Dupree, "Afghanistan Under the Khalq," Problems of Communism (July-August 1979): 34-50; Dupree, "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 1979," American University Field Staff Reports no. 32 (1979); Dupree, "Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part I and Part II," American University Field Staff Reports nos. 44 and 45 (1979); and R. S. Newell, "Revolution and revolt in Afghanistan," The World Today (November 1979): 432-442. A comprehensive and insightful approach is developed in F. Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," New Left Review (November-December 1978): 3-44.
4. See W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953) for a narrative of the "great game."
5. The activities of Abdur Rahman are treated in H. K. Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979); V. Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); L. Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); and L. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).
6. Quoted in Dupree, cited in note 5, p. xvii.
7. Modernization endeavors in Turkey are discussed in I. Sunar, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development (Ankara: Ankara University Faculty of Political Science Publication No. 377, 1974); D. A. Rustow, "The modernization of Turkey in historical and comparative perspective," in Social Change and Politics in Turkey, ed. K. Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973); and B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); on Iran, see E. Abrahamian, "Oriental despotism: The case of Qajar Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (1974): 3-31; and N. R. Keddie, "Class

structure and political power in Iran since 1796," Iranian Studies 11 (1978): 303-330.

8. Quoted in Poullada, cited in note 5, p. 9. The passage is from autobiographical material apparently dictated by Abdur Rahman.
9. It is noteworthy that Babrak Karmal, the Afghan leader installed in the Soviet intervention of December 1979, began his first address to the nation with an enumeration of the groups and peoples in the country and an appeal for unity among them:

Long-suffering countrymen, soldiers, officers, workers, youth, intelligentsia, peasants, virtuous clergy, believers, honest Moslems, Sunni and Shiite, heroic men and women of our country, craftsmen, merchants and representatives of national capital, glorious tribes, peoples and nationalities of Afghanistan: Pushtu, Tadzhiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchi, Nuristani and other countrymen, who up till the present were subjected to intolerable violence and tortures from the bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin and his henchmen, those agents of United States imperialism! Unite in the name of freedom, honor and conscience of the motherland!

The entire speech is printed in the New York Times, 28 December 1979, p. A13.

10. Afghanistan's foreign relations under Abdur Rahman and Habibullah are treated in L. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
11. An inventory of agricultural activities in Afghanistan is provided in Kakar, cited in note 5; A. A. Michel, The Kabul, Kunduz, and Helmand Valleys and the National Economy of Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Field Research Program Sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Report No. 5, 1959); and G. Etienne, L'Afghanistan ou les Aleas de la Cooperation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972).
12. See Kakar, cited in note 5, pp. 181-182.
13. G. Curzon, Tales of Travel (New York: G. H. Doran, 1923), p. 72.
14. Cited in R. R. Nathan Associates, Inc., Final Report: Economic Advisory Services Provided to the Ministry of Planning, Royal Government of Afghanistan, September, 1961, to June, 1972, Washington, D.C., July, 1972, p. 18. The following statement from the Ministry of Planning, Government of the Republic of Afghanistan, First Seven Year Economic and Social Development Plan 1355-1361, Kabul, 1976, vol. 1, p. 54, is indicative of contemporary Afghan views of the "population problem."

There is no doubt that an increasing population could create a number of problems in the distant future either due to its size or from the point of view of its relationship with the economic growth of the country. A fundamental long-term population policy is therefore necessary to have a population proportionate to the economic resources.

15. F. Barth, "Pathan identity and its maintenance," in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, ed. F. Barth (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969). Other works consulted on the Pashtuns include J. W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague: Mouton, 1963); M. B. Aslanov et al., "Ethnography of Afghanistan," in Afghanistan: Some New Approaches, ed. G. Grassmuck, L. W. Adamec, and F. H. Irwin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969).
16. Afghanistan is generally characterized as being less troubled by land tenure problems than many Middle Eastern and South Asian states, although there are no data of national scope to validate this point. See Michel, cited in note 11; and C. J. Brunner, "Afghanistan's agrarian policy, (1977)," a revised version of a paper delivered at the Conference on Rural Afghanistan: The Prospects for Development, 24 September 1976, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska, Omaha.
17. See Aslanov et al., cited in note 15.
18. On conditions in the Hazarajat, see R. H. Allen, "Report on Hazarajat," (Kabul: R. R. Nathan Associates, Inc., 1963); and C. L. Jung, "Some observations of the patterns and processes of rural-urban migration to Kabul," The Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1972.
19. A population census was taken in Afghanistan in the summer of 1979 (15 June - 5 July) under conditions of civil unrest in many provinces. Only a handful of preliminary results have been announced (see note 25). In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of government programs—including draft registration, smallpox vaccination and malaria eradication, and small-scale surveys, including a 1964 questionnaire returned by 413 village headmen, urban employment and household expenditure surveys, and several agricultural surveys—yielded population information that was partial in nature. United Nations estimates of Afghanistan's population size over the last 30 years have been derived from an estimate of dubious validity provided by the government in 1961. According to the UN Demographic Yearbook, total population was 11.7 million in 1950, 13.8 million in 1960, 17.1 million in 1970, 19.3 million in 1975, and 20.3 million in 1977; see A. Hill, "The population of Afghanistan," draft report for the World Bank, May 1979, for a discussion of the UN estimates. The 1961 government estimate of 13.8 million was based on military registration figures in areas where identity cards had been issued. In other areas, administrative estimates of the number of males were used; see "Country statement: Afghanistan," Indian Population Bulletin 4 (January 1967). A

government estimate of 16.7 million for 1976 appears in the text of the seven-year plan cited in note 14, vol. 1, p. 53.

20. See National Demographic and Family Guidance Survey of the Settled Population of Afghanistan (ADS), Volume 1: Demography; Volume 2: Methodology, sponsored by the Government of Afghanistan and USAID, 1975, and Infant and Early Childhood Mortality in Relation to Fertility Patterns, Report of an Ad-Hoc Survey in Greater Kabul, Afghanistan, 1973-1974, (Kabul: Ministry of Public Health, 1978).
21. Statistical and data collection aspects of the survey are reviewed in G. Feri, "Demographic research in Afghanistan: A national survey of the settled population," Afghanistan Council Occasional Paper No. 13, 1977; and ADS, cited in note 20, vol. 2. Time limitations and logistical problems prevented the survey team from a sampling the data base needed for a quantitative stratification of the country. Sample districts were chosen, partly on the basis of population data obtained from a 1966 Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation Survey. However, field results called into question the reliability of the 1966 survey information, and the ADS group turned to areal photographic techniques and to male registration figures for the size measures needed to estimate population totals. The Ministry of Interior supplied population totals for use in identifying urban locations, while prediction for nonsample urban areas relied on photo-structure counts rather than registration figures.
22. See A. Hill and E. Zlotnik, "The sampling scheme of the ADS survey," Appendix to Hill, cited in note 19. The quality of the records of male registration is a major issue. ADS findings were never officially accepted by the government; nevertheless, the 1976 government estimate cited in note 19 and the preparatory work for the 1979 census draw on ADS results.
23. Adjusted estimates are presented in J. P. Spitler and N. B. Frank, "Afghanistan: A demographic uncertainty," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Research Document No. 6, September 1978.
24. The 2.4 million figure for the nomadic population appears in the seven-year plan cited in note 14, vol. 1, p. 53. This figure was mentioned in government documents throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.
25. Comparable estimates were announced for the 1979 population census. Results, issued on 2 October 1979 and published in the Middle East Economic Digest, 12 October 1979, p. 29, showed a preliminary count of 15.54 million (8 million males, 7.54 million females) consisting of urban (1.72 million), rural settled (11.32 million), and nomadic components (2.5 million).
26. These estimates are taken from Jung, cited in note 18.
27. See Allen, cited in note 18.

28. These estimates are from Spitler and Frank, cited in note 23. Similar results based on an alternative estimation technique are presented in J. Trussell and E. Brown, "A close look at the demography of Afghanistan," Demography 16 (1979):137-156.
29. Estimated age-specific fertility rates for the urban and rural populations are provided in Trussell and Brown, cited in note 28. The GKS fertility data are analyzed in T. Dyson, "Infant, child and maternal mortality and associated conditions of health in the Greater Kabul Region of Afghanistan," draft, February 1980.
30. These estimates are from Spitler and Frank, cited in note 23, who acknowledge difficulties in fitting reported rates, according to which female mortality is higher than male mortality, to a reasonably consistent pattern. Trussell and Brown, cited in note 28, consider it pointless to derive separate male and female estimates on the basis of the small number of cases in the sample. The findings of rural-urban differentials reported in this paragraph are taken from Trussell and Brown and from Dyson, cited in note 29.
31. Information on cause of death was obtained in the GKS and is discussed in Dyson, cited in note 29. Also see USAID, "Health sector assessment and strategy," USAID mission to Afghanistan, Kabul, March 1978, mimeo.
32. See Hill, cited in note 19; and Spitler and Frank, cited in note 23.
33. For women without children, the mean desired number of children was 4.4. What is noteworthy, and may reflect the strong preference for male children, is that high-parity women continue to want more children. For example, women of parities 4, 5, and 6 wanted 2.1, 1.0, and 1.1 additional children. At all parity levels the number of additional children wanted was higher for rural women. For further details see ABE, cited in note 20, vol. 1, pp. 111-116.
34. The World Bank estimated per capita income in 1978 in Afghanistan at \$149 and in Pakistan at \$171. The infant mortality rate was reported as 112 per thousand in Pakistan in 1978 and 139 per thousand based on ABE findings in Afghanistan in 1978. See World Bank, World Development Report, 1978 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1978), pp. 76, 104.
35. On the period of Anandkar and Everest in Afghanistan in the interwar years, see Phillips and Greenham, both cited in note 5.
36. The Pashtunistan crisis and other circumstances leading to the Soviet bid offer are discussed in Spain, cited in note 13; Dupree, cited in note 5; and P. J. Reardon, "Modernization and reform: The contemporary endeavor," in Afghanistan: Some New Approaches, cited in note 15.
37. R. S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 144, provides a breakdown of the \$1.1 billion received by Afghanistan up to 1967 according to the amounts supplied by major

donors. M. Fry, The Afghan Economy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974) surveys trends in aid flows in the 1952-72 period. Halliday, cited in note 3, p. 37, reports that the Soviet Union gave \$1.3 billion in the 1954-70 period.

38. The reorganization of the Afghan army is discussed in Spain, cited in note 15; and in J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1969).
39. See N. M. Kamrany, Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan: American and Soviet Models for Economic Aid (Washington, D.C.: Communication Service Corporation, 1969), p. 107.
40. Sectors and "zones of influence" are described in Dupree, cited in note 5; and in M. L. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967).
41. On etatism in Turkey see Lewis, cited in note 7; Z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition (The Hague: Van Keulen, 1958). On Iran, see A. Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961). The influence of Turkish etatist ideas and practices in Afghanistan is discussed in Michel, cited in note 11.
42. Quoted from the Second Plan document in R. R. Nathan Associates, cited in note 14, p. 18.
43. The treatment of the religious establishment under Daud is reviewed in Newell, cited in note 37.
44. The record of etatism in Turkey is analyzed in Hershlag, cited in note 41; and R. D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). Accomplishments in Afghanistan are summarized in R. R. Nathan Associates, cited in note 14; and in Fry, cited in note 37.
45. Economic problems encountered during the third planning period (1968-72) are reviewed in Ministry of Planning, Draft Fourth Five Year National Development Plan for Afghanistan, Kabul, 1973. The average annual rate of growth in national income in the period is put at 1.5 percent. The rate of growth of national income during 1968-75 is estimated at 2.4 percent in the seven-year planning document, cited in note 14.
47. R. R. Nathan Associates, Inc., Planning Study of the Agricultural Sector of Afghanistan, vol. 1, prepared for the Asian Development Bank and the Royal Government of Afghanistan, Washington, D.C., 1971, reports that nearly 70 percent of agricultural expenditures in the third planning period, much as in earlier periods, went to large-scale irrigation projects.
48. A considerable literature has developed on the HAVA project. On the political significance of the project and the enormous blunders committed in the 1950s, see Michel, cited in note 11. A review of expenditures and

problems through the early 1970s appears in USAID, "The Helmand Valley intensive development project," mimeo, n.d.; useful discussions are included in Dupree, cited in note 5, and Fry, cited in note 37; on Ningrahar, see Etienne, cited in note 11, and the seven year plan, cited in note 14.

49. USAID, "Helmand reconnaissance mission report," mimeo, n.d., reports rapid increases in wheat, cotton, and corn production during 1970-76 and rapid growth of average farmowner income during 1963-1976. The seven year plan, cited in note 14, indicates that 160,000 hectares of land are fully irrigated in the HAVA area. Reliable data are lacking--for example, on the number of families who have moved into the area in the last 30 years, the net increase in cultivable land, government expenditures on various items, and so forth--that would permit an ex post benefit-cost analysis of the entire project.
50. Etienne, cited in note no. 11, p. 20, places the cost of the Ningrahar project, in which Soviet experts assisted the Afghans in such extraordinary activities as transporting topsoil to cover more than 6,000 hectares of stony land, in the range of US\$4,000-7,000 per hectare (1970 dollars).
51. The seven-year plan, cited in note 14, estimates the average annual growth rate of agricultural output during 1968-75 as 0.7 percent. Fry, cited in note 37, p. 11, reports a small decrease in per capita food production in Afghanistan during 1953-73.
52. Newell, cited in note 37, is insistent on this point.
53. Selections from the series of articles by Zaboli appear in Etienne, cited in note 11, pp. 223-224.
54. R. R. Nathan Associates, cited in note 14, provides an unflattering account of planning and project analysis in Afghanistan. Administrative problems are acknowledged in the fourth plan and in the seven year plan. The fourth plan document, cited in note 45, p. 6, gives examples of low-capacity utilization in individual enterprises.
55. The seven-year planning document, cited in note 14, calls attention to the limited growth of government revenues and the poor quality of fiscal management. Fry, cited in note 37, pp. 50 and 165, gives examples of government miscalculations in setting agricultural support prices and in designing an income tax.
56. Zaboli, cited in note 53.
57. L. L. Mitchell, "Provincial development" (Kabul: USAID/Afghanistan, mimeo, 1973), p. 2, reported that 100 percent of development expenditures had gone to ten of Afghanistan's then 28 provinces covering 40 percent of the population.

58. M. Ali, Progressive Afghanistan (Lahore: 1933), pp. 177-178. The paragraph is quoted in Fry, cited in note 37, pp. 9-10, introducing a discussion of the gains made in Afghanistan during 1930-73.
59. On the period of parliamentary politics in Afghanistan, see R. Magnus, "The Constitution of 1964: A decade of political experimentation," in Afghanistan in the 1970s, ed. L. Dupree and L. Albert (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 50-75.
60. See R. Newell, "Foreign relations," in Afghanistan in the 1970s, cited in note 59, pp. 76-90.
61. Fraser-Tytler, cited in note 4, p. 134.
62. Some of the initial statements and actions of Babrak Karmal are reported in P. Halliday, "War in Afghanistan," New Left Review no. 119 (January-February 1980):36-37.
63. One American advisory group attributed the "aid-weariness" that became evident in the late 1960s to donor "disappointment in the Afghan revenue effort, lack of sound feasible projects and deep concern over the general absence of progress and of convincing evidence that improved administration and better performance would be forthcoming." The same report suggests that initial donor expectations were unrealistic and that donors were partly responsible, through their participation in the decision-making process, for the climate of stagnation and frustration in Afghanistan. See R. R. Nathan Associates, cited in note 14, pp. 100-101, 187.
64. Ministry of Planning, cited in note 14, pp. 21, 23.
65. For further details see the Middle East Economic Digest, 30 June 1978, pp. 6-7, and 23 March 1979, p. 21.
66. The agriculture-based approach is described succinctly in R. R. Nathan Associates, cited in note 47.

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